Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

3-5-89 . . . One of the articles that I plan to write in the next couple of years is on moral argument. I agree with Joel Feinberg [1926-2004] that moral argument is necessarily ad hominem—not in the fallacious sense, but in the sense that it’s “to the person”. If someone disagrees with me about a moral matter, I may try to persuade him or her to change beliefs. I do this by finding out what the person already believes, either generally or in particular, and then showing that he or she is committed to some further principle or proposition. In other words, I show the person what he or she must believe, in order to believe certain other things. As a philosopher, this is attractive, for I reject the idea that there are moral foundations, or that a moral proposition can be proved, demonstrated, or conclusively justified. Unless someone is willing to accept it, the argument fails. Another nice feature of this theory of moral argument is that the persuading party does not have to believe the premises of the argument. Suppose I’m trying to get a theist to believe that p, where p is a religious proposition. I’m not a theist myself, but this doesn’t prevent me from arguing with the theist. I start with something that the theist accepts and then show him or her what follows logically. As I say, I find this a very attractive conception of moral argument, and I hope to explore it in a future essay.