The discussion in the preceding section will have shown that not all the different views that are taken of the ultimate reason for doing what is concluded to be right lead to practically different methods of arriving at this conclusion. Indeed we find that almost any method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason by means of some—often plausible—assumption. Hence arises difficulty in the classification and comparison of ethical systems; since they often appear to have different affinities according as we consider Method or Ultimate Reason. In my treatment of the subject, difference of Method is taken as the paramount consideration: and it is on this account that I have treated the view in which Perfection is taken to be the Ultimate End as a variety of the Intuitionism which determines right conduct by reference to axioms of duty intuitively known; while I have made as marked a separation as possible between Epicureanism or Egoistic Hedonism, and the Universalistic or Benthamite Hedonism to which I propose to restrict the term Utilitarianism.
I am aware that these two latter methods are commonly treated as closely connected: and it is not difficult to find reasons for this. In the first place, they agree in prescribing actions as means to an end distinct from, and lying outside the actions; so that they both lay down rules which are not absolute but relative, and only valid if they conduce to the end. Again, the ultimate end is according to both methods the same in quality, i.e. pleasure; or, more strictly, the maximum of pleasure attainable, pains being subtracted. Besides, it is of course to a great extent true that the conduct recommended by the one principle coincides with that inculcated by the other. Though it would seem to be only in an ideal polity that 'self-interest well understood' leads to the perfect discharge of all social duties, still, in a tolerably well-ordered community it prompts to the fulfilment of most of them, unless under very exceptional circumstances. And, on the other hand, a Universalistic Hedonist may reasonably hold that his own happiness is that portion of the universal happiness which it is most in his power to promote, and which therefore is most especially entrusted to his charge. And the practical blending of the two systems is sure to go beyond their theoretical coincidence. It is much easier for a man to move in a sort of diagonal between Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism, than to be practically a consistent adherent of either. Few men are so completely selfish, whatever their theory of morals may be, as not occasionally to promote the happiness of others from natural sympathetic impulse unsupported by Epicurean calculation. And probably still fewer are so resolutely unselfish as never to find "all men's good'' in their own with rather too ready conviction.
(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. I, chap. VI, sec. 3, pp. 83-4 [footnote omitted] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])
Note from KBJ: Two things are worthy of comment in this passage by Sidgwick. First, he is pointing out the theoretical similarities between egoism and utilitarianism, which are often thought to be radically dissimilar. Both theories are teleological or consequentialist in nature. That is, both theories claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends solely on its consequences. In this respect, they differ from deontological theories, which claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends on something other than, or in addition to, its consequences. Another similarity is that both theories are hedonistic. That is, both theories claim that there is only one thing that is intrinsically good, namely, pleasure, and only one thing that is intrinsically bad, namely, pain. (We could say that both theories are monistic as well, which means that both theories claim that there is only one intrinsically good thing.) The difference between the theories is whose pleasures and pains count. To an egoist, only the agent's pleasures and pains count. To a utilitarian, the pleasures and pains of everyone affected by the act (including the agent) count. Egoism is a species (but not the only species) of partialism; utilitarianism is impartialism. The second thing worthy of comment in Sidgwick's passage is that, as he says, there may be a significant overlap between egoism and utilitarianism, as far as which acts the theories classify as right or wrong. The overlap is not perfect, however. All it takes to show that two theories are different is one case in which the theories generate different evaluations, and there certainly are such cases. Some critics of egoism make it seem as though there is little overlap between the theories, i.e., that they generate different evaluations in many or most cases. I'm with Sidgwick in thinking that there is significant overlap.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 