I will consider one other causal fallacy, which often leads to governments or individuals being unfairly blamed or extravagantly praised. Suppose that there is a critical situation in which a government or a leading statesman has a choice of one or other of a comparatively few practically possible alternative courses of action, A, B and C, including among these the possible alternative of doing nothing and letting events take their course. Alternative A is chosen, and we will suppose that the state of affairs which ensues is admittedly much worse than that which immediately preceded the decision. Then it is very common to hold that a wrong decision was made, and to blame severely the individual or the government which made it. Now of course such a judgment may be justified in some cases. But in most cases a whole nest of fallacies is involved. In the first place, even if a different decision would have had a more fortunate sequel, it does not follow that the maker of the actual decision was blameworthy. Before we can decide this we must know whether, in the situation in which he was placed and with the information which was available to him at the time, he might reasonably have been expected to see that the consequences would be much worse than those of some other alternative which he might reasonably have been expected to contemplate as possible. The mere fact, if it be a fact, that we can see all this after the event may have very little bearing on this question.
Secondly, the mere fact that the state of affairs which followed the choice of alternative A was much worse than that which preceded it is not sufficient evidence that the decision was mistaken. It may be that the ensuing state of affairs would have been much worse than the preceding whichever of the alternatives had been adopted, and that the results of adopting any other would have been still worse than those of adopting A. Men find it very hard to admit that there are situations in which all possible alternative developments will be changes for the worse, and where the wisest decision that can be made will do no more than minimize the inevitably ensuing evil. Suppose that we tacitly and unjustifiably assume that there are no such situations. Then we shall automatically conclude that there must have been some alternative open to the maker of the decision which would have averted the evils which in fact ensued and would not have been followed by still greater evils. And so we shall judge that the actual decision was mistaken. But there is no reason whatever to accept this premise, and therefore there is no reason to accept any such judgment as a conclusion from it.
It is on such grounds as these, e.g., that the decision of the British Cabinet to go to war with Germany in 1914, or the agreement made by Mr. Chamberlain with Hitler at Munich, has been confidently asserted by many persons to have been unwise and to have redounded to the discredit of those concerned. Naturally I express no opinion here on the truth or falsity of these judgments. What I do contend is this. Most of those who make them with so much confidence have not begun to realize how many questions would have to be raised and settled before they had a shadow of justification for their assertions. Moreover, some of these questions can never be answered even approximately, for they involve conjectures about the consequences which would have followed if other alternatives had been chosen.
(C. D. Broad, "Some Common Fallacies in Political Thinking," Philosophy 25 [April 1950]: 99-113, at 111-2 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: Was the 2003 invasion of Iraq justified? Even if things had turned out badly (some ideologues probably think they have, or will), it would not follow that President Bush, who ordered the invasion, is blameworthy for it. All we heard from progressives during and after the invasion is "Bush lied [about Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction]!" That, sadly, is about as edifying as it got. Progressives never asked whether, "in the situation in which [President Bush] was placed and with the information which was available to him at the time, he might reasonably have been expected to see that the consequences would be much worse than those of some other alternative which he might reasonably have been expected to contemplate as possible." I said many times during and after the invasion of Iraq that there needs to be a serious, informed public discussion of the morality of the invasion (or of war generally). We never got it. Bush-hatred ruled the day. Philosophers in particular were not on the job. Had they been, they would have led the discussion, pointing out fallacies of the sort identified by Broad 59 years ago. Many of my philosophical colleagues across the country (and around the world) abdicated their responsibility and wasted their training. They were progressives first and philosophers second. Socrates would be appalled, as I am.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 