It must be confessed that when, as with rule-utilitarianism, moral theory contradicts moral intuition only in a few farfetched cases, moral intuition is far from a safe guide. Against act-utilitarianism it suffices; for act-utilitarianism if I am right about its implications, outrages moral intuition at almost every turn. Rule-utilitarianism, on the other hand, provides so persuasive a theoretical basis for common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not theory, is corrupt. Moral theory must account for common morality, which act-utilitarianism does not do; but individual moral intuitions are not sacrosanct. One important reason for inquiring into moral theory is to purify our moral beliefs.
(Alan Donagan, "Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?" in Contemporary Utilitarianism, ed. Michael D. Bayles [Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1968], 187-202, at 198)
Note from KBJ: What effect should intuitions have on normative ethical theory? Logically, there are three possibilities: nothing, something, and everything. Some people, such as J. J. C. Smart and Peter Singer, say that intuitions are irrelevant. If one is convinced that one has the "correct" theory, one should not care whether it accords with one's intuitions. Some people, such as John Rawls, say that intuitions are relevant but not dispositive. The aim of moral theorizing is to find a "reflective equilibrium" between one's theory and one's intuitions or considered judgments. Some people say that intuitions are dispositive. Unless one's theory is compatible with all of one's intuitions, or with all of "common morality," it must be rejected. If we define the first of these views as moral progressivism (or radicalism), then the second and third views constitute two types of conservatism, one weaker than the other. If we define the third of these views as moral conservatism, then the first and second views constitute two types of progressivism, one weaker than the other.
Another way to look at this is in terms of the purpose of normative ethical theory. Those who hold the first view see normative ethical theory as prescriptive. Its purpose, they say, is to revise or reform our moral beliefs, not account for those we happen to have. Those who hold the third view see normative ethical theory as descriptive. Its purpose, they say, is to systematize, ground, rationalize, or justify our moral beliefs, not revise or reform them. Those who hold the second view see normative ethical theory as both descriptive and prescriptive. Its purpose, they say, is to systematize, ground, rationalize, or justify our most firmly held moral beliefs, while revising or reforming those that are less firmly held (or in some way suspicious). In the paragraph quoted, Donagan endorses the second view, which, depending on how we label the views, is either weak conservatism or weak progressivism. The problem with act utilitarianism, Donagan says, is that it is incompatible with too many of our intuitions. Rule utilitarianism does better on this score, but still leaves room for revision of certain of our moral beliefs. I should point out that Donagan is not a rule utilitarian. He is merely comparing the two versions of utilitarianism and pointing out that one of them (rule utilitarianism) is superior to the other.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 
