To sum up my own view of the task of moral philosophy: it is to help us to understand the moral questions that we are troubled about, and by so doing to help us answer them, either by ourselves or in discussion with those with whom we are in dispute. But from his paper it does not look as if this were quite Mr. Katz's view. He makes it look as if he thought it was the task of moral philosophy to provide people, who (whether or not they understand what the moral questions mean) are absolutely certain that they are right about the answers to them, with a way of infallibly converting those who do not already agree with them. That is, I think, why he speaks as if the function of moral philosophy were some sort of propaganda—he uses expressions like this: 'the "correct" propaganda, i.e., a liberal moral philosophy such as Professor Hare's'; 'Are we to assume that these lower instincts and uncontrollable passions will automatically disappear when met with liberal propaganda?'. The reason why Mr. Katz talks like this is, perhaps, that he thinks that it is the task of the moral philosopher to put into the hands of the radical (who of course already knows that he is right, so he doesn't need any help in solving his moral problems, because he hasn't got any)—to put into the hands of the radical a propaganda weapon which will turn all the intellectual bullets of the fascists into water. Now I do not think that the philosopher is this kind of witch-doctor. His task is quite different, and I want to try to persuade you that it is a useful and indeed essential one. It is not a sound criticism of any moral philosopher that he cannot do what Mr. Katz seems to want him to do.
(R. M. Hare, "Reply to 'Liberals, Fanatics and Not-So-Innocent-Bystanders,'" chap. 3 in Jowett Papers, 1968-1969, ed. B. Y. Khanbhai, R. S. Katz, and R. A. Pineau [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970], 44-52, at 46 [italics in original; page references omitted])
Note from KBJ: Explanation and justification are different activities, though they are sometimes confused. One reason why they are confused is that both make use of the concept of a reason. But there are two different types of reason. An explanatory reason is a reason why something is the case. It is taken for granted that the thing in question is the case; the question is why. What explains it? A justificatory reason is a reason that something is the case. This activity would make no sense unless it were an open question (to some extent) whether the thing is the case. Here's an example. Nobody doubts that dogs bark, but we don't know why they bark. Scientists try to explain why they bark. Why is the sky blue? Why are men taller than women? Why is the crime rate higher among blacks than it is among whites? Why has there never been a female president? Children, like scientists, ask a lot of explanatory questions. In a way, scientists are perpetual children.
Philosophy differs from science in that scientists seek explanations, while philosophers seek justifications. Was the invasion of Iraq justified? Reasonable people can differ on this question. I may say yes; you may say no. I may supply reasons for my affirmative answer; you may supply reasons for your negative answer. I may then find fault with your reasons, just as you may find fault with my reasons. This is how philosophical argumentation proceeds. It is a rational, in the sense of reason-giving, activity.
Some philosophers (mainly progressives) seem uninterested in argumentation. On questions such as whether the invasion of Iraq was justified, or whether there should be an absolute legal prohibition of torture, or whether homosexual "marriage" should be allowed, their minds are made up. They are not interested either in providing reasons for their beliefs or in finding fault with the reasons of those who disagree with them. What these philosophers tend to do, instead of arguing, is explain why those who disagree with them hold the views they do. It is said, for example, that people who oppose homosexual "marriage" are homophobes (or latent homosexuals). It is said that people who supported the invasion of Iraq are warmongers (or worse: brainwashed by the Bush administration!). I've even heard it said that philosophers should not discuss whether torture is justified in ticking-bomb situations, because that will make people think that torture is justified in other situations. (Dumb people!)
I don't get it. Why would someone go into a field like philosophy, which has a long tradition of providing justifications, and then refuse to engage in that activity? If you want to explain why people believe or act the way they do, you should go into science (or take up a pseudo-science such as psychoanalysis). When I come across a philosopher (by which I mean someone who has philosophical training) who refuses to argue, but enjoys "explaining" (the explanations are almost always speculative and insulting) why people disagree with him or her, it saddens me. This person is wasting his or her skills. This is not to say that philosophers should never believe anything. It is to say that philosophers should provide reasons for their beliefs and find fault with the reasons of those who disagree with them. A philosopher should never merely assume that others are wrong, just because their beliefs differ. If they are wrong, reason will be able to disclose it.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 