In the Judaeo-Christian tradition, at least, there is evidence to suggest that this desire to be with God is not to be encouraged because it would entail forsaking various other ministries which believers should desire to fulfil. Paul, for instance (Philippians i, 21-26; 2 Corinthians v, 1-10) indicates that he would rather light out for better pastures but recognizes that he should stay to do his appointed tasks. Similarly, though early Christian martyrs embraced death when its inevitability became clear they did not actively seek it. So a Christian who actively sought death while various ministries remained open to him would warrant some restraint in order that opportunity might be afforded him to consider his responsibilities. In addition to this consideration the fact that there is a degree of doubt about the certainty of entering the after-life surely demands that we adopt a conservative view about allowing people to seek to realize such desires without interference. I share with other writers the position that 'weak' paternalistic interventions are justifiable in order to protect a person's opportunity subsequently to give more informed consent, while 'strong' paternalistic interventions are justifiable to preserve a wider range of future autonomy for a person. Weak paternalism would seem to be in order in a case of the present sort. I suggest, therefore, that if other things are equal my formula does not license the killing of those who long to be with God in heaven.
(Robert Young, "What Is So Wrong with Killing People?" Philosophy 54 [October 1979]: 515-28, at 523 [footnote omitted])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 