Utilitarianism conceives our moral obligations to derive from the putative obligation to increase good and diminish evil, no matter what must be done to this or that individual. I wish to maintain, on the contrary, that moral obligations derive from the obligation to respect the independence and worth of every individual, no matter at what cost in good forgone and evil accepted. Violating the moral rights of this or that individual seldom in the end turns out well for others; but that is not why such violations are wrong.
(Alan Donagan, "Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?" in Contemporary Utilitarianism, ed. Michael D. Bayles [Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1968], 187-202, at 202 [italics added])
Note from KBJ: The dichotomy between utilitarianism and absolutist deontology (i.e., absolutism) is false. There is a third theoretical possibility: moderate deontology (think W. D. Ross). Moderate deontology holds (1) that certain acts, such as torture, are intrinsically wrong, and (2) that these acts are justified if enough good is produced (where "good" includes the prevention of evil). Suppose Donagan were to argue as follows:
1. There are only two normative ethical theories—utilitarianism and absolutism—and one of them must be accepted.
2. Utilitarianism is unacceptable.
Therefore,
3. Absolutism must be accepted.
The first premise of this valid argument is false. The argument, therefore, is unsound. This doesn't mean that absolutism must not be accepted, for unsound arguments can have true conclusions. It means that this argument in support of absolutism doesn't, in fact, provide any support.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 