Logical pragmatics could be conceived of as the study of the uses of reasoning in a context of discussion. But what, then, is logic? Is it the study of the abstract forms of reasoning exclusively, or can it comprise the uses of reasoning, as the emerging practices of so-called informal logic seem to suggest? One thing we can say is that in a critical discussion, logical reasoning can be used where one party, in dialogue with another party, tries to convince this other party that his (the first party's) point of view is right. In this use of reasoning, the premises are concessions made by one party to the discussion, typically at the request of the other party. Conclusions are propositions drawn from these premises by the warrants appropriate for the discussion, or agreed to by the participants.
Along these lines, then, it seems appropriate to offer an abstract definition of reasoning which, in order to be fully understood, needs to be placed in a pragmatic context of use. As a first pass, let us consider the following proposed definition.
Reasoning is the making or granting of assumptions called premises (starting points) and the process of moving toward conclusions (end points) from these assumptions by means of warrants. A warrant is a rule or frame that allows the move from one point to the next point in the sequence of reasoning. The term 'warrant', used instead of the more familiar (but narrower) term 'rule', is appropriate because of the existence of frame-based, and other kinds of non-rule-based reasoning.
(Douglas N. Walton, "What Is Reasoning? What Is an Argument?" The Journal of Philosophy 87 [August 1990]: 399-419, at 402-3 [italics in original; footnotes omitted])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 