But to get back to fairness, when is the "fight" between contending lifestyles a fair one? No parliamentary body legislates these things; we have no "moral constitution" specifying the permissible means of persuasion; there are no written rules of procedure analogous to those governing judicial proceedings. But if the idea of fairness is to have any application to the processes of cultural change, I should think that it would rule out all influences on the outcome but the perceived merits and demerits of the alternatives. He who would reform our moral environment by fair means should be prepared openly and forthrightly to express his dissent, and attempt to argue, persuade, and offer reasons, while continuing to live in his own preferred way with persuasive quiet and dignity, neither harming others nor offering counterpersuasive offense to tender sensibilities. On the other hand, a citizen uses illegitimate means of social change when he abandons argument and example for indoctrination and propaganda, force and fraud. If the latter are the things that make the contest unfair, then it is surely unfair to use the power of the state to affect moral belief one way or the other. . . . A contest is fair when neither contender has an unfair advantage; it can hardly be fair when the referee forcibly sides with one of the contenders.
(Joel Feinberg, "Legal Moralism and Freefloating Evils," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 [January-April 1980]: 122-55, at 145 [italics in original; ellipsis added])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 