I need now to say a few more things about the counter-intuitive nature of the Equivalence Thesis [the thesis that "letting die is just as bad as killing"].
The fact that this view has radical implications for conduct has been cited as a reason for rejecting it. [Richard] Trammell complains that 'Denial of the distinction between negative and positive duties leads straight to an ethic so strenuous that it might give pause even to a philosophical John the Baptist'. Suppose John is about to buy a phonograph record, purely for his enjoyment, when he is reminded that with this five dollars a starving person could be fed. On the view I am defending, he ought to give the money to feed the hungry person. This may not seem exceptional until we notice that the reasoning is reiterable. Having given the first five dollars, John is not free to use another five to buy the record. For the poor are always with him: there is always another starving person to be fed, and then another, and then another. 'The problem', Trammell says, 'is that, even though fulfilment of one particular act of aid involves only minimal effort, it sets a precedent for millions of such efforts.' So we reach the bizarre conclusion that it is almost always immoral to buy phonograph records! And the same goes for fancy clothes, cars, toys, and so on.
This sort of reductio argument is of course familiar in philosophy. Such arguments may be divided into three categories. The strongest sort shows that a theory entails a contradiction, and, since contradictions cannot be tolerated, the theory must be modified or rejected. Such arguments, when valid, are of course devastating. Second, an argument may show that a theory has a consequence which, while not inconsistent, is nevertheless demonstrably false—that is, an independent proof can be given that the offensive consequence is unacceptable. Arguments of this second type, while not quite so impressive as the first, can still be irresistible. The third type of reductio is markedly weaker than the others. Here, it is merely urged that some consequence of a theory is counter-intuitive. The supposedly embarrassing consequence is perfectly consistent, and there is no proof that it is false; the complaint is only that it goes against our unreflective, pretheoretical beliefs. Now sometimes even this weak sort of argument can be effective, especially when we have not much confidence in the theory, or when our confidence in the pretheoretical belief is unaffected by the reasoning which supports the theory. However, it may happen that the same reasoning which leads one to accept a theory also persuades one that the pretheoretical beliefs were wrong. (If this did not happen, philosophy would always be in the service of what we already think; it could never challenge and change our beliefs, and would be, in an important sense, useless.) The present case, it seems to me, is an instance of this type. The same reasoning which leads to the view that we are as wicked as Jack Palance, and that killing is no worse than letting die, also persuades (me, at least) that the prereflective belief in the rightness of our affluent life-style is mistaken.
So, I want to say about all this what H. P. Grice once said at a conference when someone objected that his theory of meaning had an unacceptable implication. Referring to the supposedly embarrassing consequence, Grice said, 'See here, that's not an objection to my theory—that's my theory!' Grice not only accepted the implication, he claimed it as an integral part of what he wanted to say. Similarly, the realization that we are morally wrong to spend money on inessentials, when that money could go to feed the starving, is an integral part of the view I am defending. It is not an embarrassing consequence of the view; it is (part of) the view itself.
(James Rachels, "Killing and Starving to Death," Philosophy 54 [April 1979]: 159-71, at 168-9 [italics in original; boldface and underlining added; footnotes omitted])
Note from KBJ: What Rachels never understood, sadly, is that people's intuitions differ. Notice the number of times he uses the words "our" and "we," as though everyone reacts the same way to the various cases he describes. (I underlined the five occurrences.) They do not. If people's intuitions differ, as in fact they do, then they will be attracted to or repelled by different normative ethical theories. Utilitarianism may systematize and rationalize your intuitions but not mine. Egoism may systematize and rationalize my intuitions but not yours. All Grice was saying is that his theory of meaning systematizes his intuitions about meaning. This doesn't mean that his theory is correct or that anyone else's theory is incorrect. Indeed, it makes no sense to say that a normative theory (ethical or otherwise) is correct or incorrect. A normative theory is a sorting device, not a picture of reality. Most people, including me, reject Rachels's Equivalence Thesis on the ground that it contradicts many of their intuitions (including their firmest intuitions). Rachels is willing to accept the implications of the thesis (though I doubt that he lived in accordance with it). He is a bullet biter. This means that when his theory clashes with his intuitions, he sticks with his theory and gives up the intuitions. That's one strategy for achieving consistency. Another is to modify or abandon the theory. That Rachels prefers the Equivalence Thesis to his intuitions gives nobody else a reason to do so. He speaks only for himself, as he seems to recognize when he adds, in parentheses, "me, at least."
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 