Let us proceed, then, to consider how far the social sanction
in such cases supplies the defects of the legal. No doubt the hope of
praise and liking and services from one's fellow-men, and the fear of
forfeiting these and incurring instead aversion, refusal of aid, and
social exclusion, are considerations often important enough to
determine the rational egoist to law-observance, even in default of
adequate legal penalties. Still these sanctions are liable to fail
just where the legal penalties are defective; social no less than
legal penalties are evaded by secret crimes; and in cases of criminal
revolutionary violence, the efficacy of the social sanction is apt to
be seriously impaired by the party spirit enlisted on the side of the
criminal. For it has to be observed that the force of the social
sanction diminishes very rapidly, in proportion to the number of
dissidents from the common opinion that awards it. Disapprobation
that is at once intense and quite universal would be so severe a
penalty as perhaps to outweigh any imaginable advantages; since it
seems impossible for a human being to live happily, whatever other
goods he may enjoy, without the kindly regards of some of his fellows:
and so, in contemplating the conventional portrait of the tyrant, who
is represented as necessarily suspicious of those nearest him, even of
the members of his own family, we feel prepared to admit that such a
life must involve the extreme of unhappiness. But when we turn to
contemplate the actual tyrannical usurpers, wicked statesmen,
successful leaders of unwarranted rebellion, and, speaking generally,
the great criminals whose position raises them out of the reach of
legal penalties, it does not appear that the moral odium under which
they lie must necessarily count for much in an egoistic calculation of
the gain and loss resulting from their conduct. For this disesteem is
only expressed by a portion of the community: and its utterance is
often drowned in the loud-voiced applause of the multitude whose
admiration is largely independent of moral considerations. Nor are
there wanting philosophers and historians whose judgment manifests a
similar independence.
It seems, then, impossible to affirm that the external sanctions of
men's legal duties will always be sufficient to identify duty with
interest. And a corresponding assertion would be still more
unwarranted in respect of moral duties not included within the sphere
of Law. In saying this, I am fully sensible of the force of what may
be called the Principle of Reciprocity, by which certain utilitarians
have endeavoured to prove the coincidence of any individual's interest
with his social duties. Virtues (they say) are qualities either
useful or directly agreeable to others: thus they either increase the
market value of the virtuous man's services, and cause others to
purchase them at a higher rate and to allot to him more dignified and
interesting functions; or they dispose men to please him, both out of
gratitude and in order to enjoy the pleasures of his society in
return: and again—since man is an imitative animal—the exhibition
of these qualities is naturally rewarded by a reciprocal manifestation
of them on the part of others, through the mere influence of
example. I do not doubt that the prospect of these advantages is an
adequate motive for cultivating many virtues and avoiding much
vice. Thus on such grounds a rational egoist will generally be strict
and punctual in the fulfilment of all his engagements, and truthful in
his assertions, in order to win the confidence of other men; and he
will be zealous and industrious in his work, in order to obtain
gradually more important and therefore more honourable and lucrative
employment; and he will control such of his passions and appetites as
are likely to interfere with his efficiency; and will not exhibit
violent anger or use unnecessary harshness even towards servants and
subordinates; and towards his equals and superiors in rank he will be
generally polite and complaisant and good-humoured, and prompt to show
them all such kindness as costs but little in proportion to the
pleasure it gives. Still, reflection seems to show that the conduct
recommended by this line of reasoning does not really coincide with
moral duty. For, first, what one requires for social success is that
one should appear, rather than be, useful to others:
and hence this motive will not restrain one from doing secret harm to
others, or even from acting openly in a way that is really harmful,
though not perceived to be so. And again, a man is not useful to
others by his virtue only, but sometimes rather by his vice; or more
often by a certain admixture of unscrupulousness with his good and
useful qualities. And further, morality prescribes the performance of
duties equally towards all, and that we should abstain as far as
possible from harming any: but on the principle of Reciprocity we
should exhibit our useful qualities chiefly towards the rich and
powerful, and abstain from injuring those who can retaliate; while we
may reasonably omit our duties to the poor and feeble, if we find a
material advantage in so doing, unless they are able to excite the
sympathy of persons who can harm us. Moreover, some vices (as for
example, many kinds of sensuality and extravagant luxury) do not
inflict any immediate or obvious injury on any individual, though they
tend in the long-run to impair the general happiness: hence few
persons find themselves strongly moved to check or punish this kind of
mischief.
(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. II, chap. V, sec. 3, pp. 166-8 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])
Note from KBJ: Sidgwick is responding to the claim that ethical egoism ("interest") coincides with commonsense morality ("duty"). He admits that it is often in one's interest to do one's duty, as commonly conceived, but denies that this is always the case. I may find that it is in my interest to neglect my duty when there is little or no chance of being found out, for example. At this point, the egoist can move from act egoism to rule egoism, just as the act utilitarian, when confronted with problem cases, can move to rule utilitarianism. Arguably, the best way to promote one's long-term rational self-interest is to follow the rules of commonsense morality. Keep your commitments. Rectify your wrongs. Repay kindnesses. Give others their due. Do good to others. Make something of yourself. Do no harm. (This list of seven duties comes from W. D. Ross.)
Note 2 from KBJ: Sidgwick writes: "[W]hat one requires for social success is that
one should appear, rather than be, useful to others." What he neglected to add is that the best way to appear useful to others is to be useful to others.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 