[T]he sense that act theory sometimes fails to get to the heart of things is generated when one moves over from third-person talk to first-person expressions about moral worth. People often try to make exceptions for themselves in practice. And this is part of what seems so properly self-corrective about moral theories which focus on universalization principles. But it is also the case that a part of the tendency to make exceptions for oneself is simply the wrongheaded outgrowth of a very reasonable concern: that often what is fundamental to me is not whether I have done the right thing, but whether I am, at bottom, a good person—not what my act was, but whether it was an index to my character. If I am satisfied that I am fundamentally a good person, then it is hard for me not to think I ought to be excused, because I will regard my wrongful acts either as necessary evils or as blunders, mistakes essentially out of character. And if I am dealt with solely in terms of my acts—their nature and consequences—it will be hard for me not to feel that that is somehow beside the point. Self-esteem is very often the crux of the matter in evaluations of one's own conduct. And self-esteem is not built entirely on estimates of the value or dutifulness of one's performance. No matter how many successes some people have, they still feel they "are" failures; no matter how many lies some people tell, they still feel they "are" fundamentally honest. Moral theorizing which ignores or slights this—as act theory tends to do—is very often beside the point in concrete moral situations.
(Lawrence C. Becker, "The Neglect of Virtue," Ethics 85 [January 1975]: 110-22, at 112 [italics in original; footnote omitted])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 