This is not at all to say that the alternative to consequentialism is that one has to accept that there are some actions which one should always do, or again some which one should never do, whatever the consequences: this is a much stronger position than any involved, as I have defined the issues, in the denial of consequentialism. All that is involved, on the present account, in the denial of consequentialism, is that with respect to some type of action, there are some situations in which that would be the right thing to do, even though the state of affairs produced by one's doing that would be worse than some other state of affairs accessible to one. The claim that there is a type of action which is right whatever the consequences can be put by saying that with respect to some type of action, assumed as being adequately specified, then whatever the situation may (otherwise) be, that will be the right thing to do, whatever other state of affairs might be accessible to one, however much better it might be than the state of affairs produced by one's doing this action.
If that somewhat Moorean formulation has not hopelessly concealed the point, it will be seen that this second position—the whatever the consequences position—is very much stronger than the first, the mere rejection of consequentialism. It is perfectly consistent, and it might be thought a mark of sense, to believe, while not being a consequentialist, that there was no type of action which satisfied this second condition: that if an adequate (and non-question-begging) specification of a type of action has been given in advance, it is always possible to think of some situation in which the consequences of doing the action so specified would be so awful that it would be right to do something else.
(Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism: For and Against, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], 75-150, at 90 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: Williams is dividing normative ethical theories into three exhaustive and exclusive types: consequentialism, absolutist deontology, and moderate deontology. I have discussed these types many times in this blog. Some people think that there are just two types of normative ethical theory: consequentialism and absolutist deontology. This is, as Williams points out, a false dichotomy, for one can reject both. A moderate deontologist holds that certain acts (such as lying, torturing, and killing innocent human beings) are intrinsically wrong, thus disagreeing with the consequentialist, who holds that no acts are intrinsically wrong. But the moderate deontologist denies that these acts are always wrong (i.e., wrong, all things considered). Even the killing of an innocent human being can be justified, according to the moderate deontologist, if doing so is necessary to prevent a great deal of evil, such as 1,000 deaths of innocent human beings. The absolutist says (in effect) that 1,000 deaths are better (morally) than one murder. The moderate says (in effect) that one murder is better (morally) than 1,000 deaths. The consequentialist says (in effect) that one death is better (morally) than 1,000 deaths. Do you see the difference between the theories?
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 