My next move should be no surprise: I take the moral permissibility of torture in the ticking time-bomb case to be self-evident; anyone who understands the details of the case would, I think, consent to the torture. If Kantianism is true, then the torture would be impermissible. But the torture is not impermissible. Therefore, Kantianism is false. Therefore we can remove it from the list of our candidate moral theories. Anyone who wishes to avoid the conclusion of this argument must deny one of its premises (since the argument is valid by modus tollens), and I do not see either premise as being challengeable: I have already argued that Kantianism is committed to opposing torture, and I really fail to see how any reasonable person could deny the permissibility of torture in the ticking time-bomb case.
(Fritz Allhoff, "A Defense of Torture: Separation of Cases, Ticking Time-bombs, and Moral Justification," International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 [2005]: 243-64, at 259 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: Allhoff is claiming, correctly, that the following three propositions are logically inconsistent:
- If Kantianism is true, then the ticking-bomb torture is impermissible.
- Kantianism is true.
- The ticking-bomb torture is permissible.