Some liberals have suggested that the question, What is the function of the state? misses the point of liberalism, liberalism being concerned with the different problem, of liberty in the state; i.e., the liberal is one who is concerned to insist on the maximum liberty possible and who enquires how it may best and most fully be realized. But unless the demand for liberty is qualified by reference to the proper function of government, it would imply anarchism; or it would become the view that it is the function of government to maximise liberty. Liberals often suggest the latter to be the true liberal view, but once it is explicitly stated and developed it would be seen to involve disregard of considerations of justice, happiness, well-being, except where concern for liberty coincided with them. Further, no notable liberal has explained liberalism in this way. All have noted the relevance of demands of justice, even where they conflict with consideration of liberty; and they have admitted some coercion to reduce suffering or to promote happiness even when such interferences are not with harmful, other-regarding actions. Liberalism, therefore, can be neither a simple view about the place of liberty in the state, nor the view that the function of the state consists solely in the promoting of liberty; instead, it must be a view which explains the place of liberty in the context of a general view of the proper function or functions of the state. [John Stuart] Mill's writings have the merit those of so many liberals lack, of showing some awareness of this.
(H. J. McCloskey, "Mill's Liberalism," The Philosophical Quarterly 13 [April 1963]: 143-56, at 144)
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 