Judith Jarvis Thomson 9-10-90 . . . The topic of discussion in today’s Contemporary Moral Problems course was Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion”, which I copied and distributed to the students free of charge this past Friday. Before delving into Thomson’s arguments and criticisms, I asked the students what they thought of her style and approach. To my dismay, several students told me that she “contradicts herself”; one said the essay was “confusing”. These are common complaints about philosophical material, but frankly, I don’t understand them. First, let me say that not only does Thomson not contradict herself; her essay is a model of clarity and rigor. There’s nothing confusing about it. I think what students interpret as contradiction is the fact that Thomson and other philosophers state other people’s arguments before criticizing them. The students think these philosophers are making the arguments themselves, in which case to criticize them would indeed be a form of contradiction—“saying one thing and then denying it”. As for the confusion, I’m confused. Several students complained that Thomson’s examples are “far-fetched” and “bizarre”, which tells me that they don’t understand their point. When Thomson gives an example from another area, her aim is to illustrate a general point, not a point about abortion. I can see that I have my work cut out for me this semester; I look upon it as a challenge.