Talking about torture involves certain risks. To talk lightly or flippantly or even detachedly about what many consider to be one of the major evils of the modern age leaves one open to charges of insensitivity or of perversion of sensibility. To suggest that the notion of torture is more complex than is commonly supposed or that it is not self-evident that all instances of torturing should be absolutely prohibited might, in some contexts, tend to have the effect of obfuscating public debate or weakening commitment or diverting attention or inhibiting action. There is even a risk that philosophical analysis of the problem may provide ammunition which could be used or abused by those who seek to justify actions which reflective and reasonable men would condemn without qualification. It has been my experience in teaching in this area that I have sometimes been regrettably persuasive when playing the rôle of Devil's Advocate. Thus talking about torture can have undesirable practical consequences or, when it has no significant consequences, it may be compared to fiddling while Rome burns.
(William Twining, "Torture and Philosophy," The Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 52 [1978]: 143-68, at 143)
Note from KBJ: It is commonplace for philosophers to inquire into the conditions in which it is morally permissible to kill innocent human beings. When it comes to torture, however, these same philosophers have grave reservations. I don't get it. One would think that if it is risky to talk about torture, it is risky to talk about killing the innocent. Is torture worse than death? Perhaps some of it is. But absolutists oppose all torture, not merely torture that is worse than death. They oppose ripping out the fingernails of a suspected terrorist, even if the pain is temporary and even if that is the only way to save thousands of innocent lives. Is ripping out fingernails worse than death? I can't believe that these philosophers, if given the choice between having their fingernails ripped out and being killed, would choose the latter. So why are they willing to tolerate killing the innocent, but not torturing? It's mind-boggling.
Note 2 from KBJ: For the record, I don't know Twining's position on the moral permissibility of killing innocent human beings. For all I know, he is an absolutist about that as well. My first note (above) is about those philosophers who believe that it is sometimes permissible to kill the innocent, but never permissible to torture.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 