Extrinsic values are partly factual, but intrinsic values are independent of facts. Suppose that health were an intrinsic value. It could be an extrinsic one too, for example in so far as healthy doctors normally can work harder and cure patients better than can unhealthy ones. It might be only an extrinsic one: health might be valued only because it promotes an intrinsic value, happiness. Many, perhaps most, disagreements about what ought to be done, are disagreements about means to agreed ends, and hence the disagreements are about matters of fact. There need not even be agreement about ultimate ends. If one disputant is a Kantian whose ultimate end is respect for persons and another is a utilitarian whose ultimate end is maximization of happiness, they may agree on seeking how to bring about some intermediate end which promotes both respect for persons and maximization of happiness. Thus the substantive argument would be on a question of fact, not of value. In a sense 'good as a means' straddles the gap between fact and value. But this does not mean that there is not a sharp distinction between factual discussion of means to ends on the one hand and value judgments on the other hand.
(J. J. C. Smart, "Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction," Philosophy 74 [July 1999]: 431-7, at 434-5 [italics in original])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 