We must ask: In the light of what principle can free and equal moral persons permit their relations to be affected by social fortune and the natural lottery? Since no one deserves his place in the distribution of talents, nor his starting place in society, desert is not an answer. Yet free and equal persons want the effects of chance to be regulated by some principle, if a reasonable principle exists.
Now when the maximin criterion is followed, the natural distribution of abilities is viewed in some respects as a collective asset. While an equal distribution might seem more in keeping with the equality of free moral persons, at least if the distribution were a matter of choice, this is not a reason for eliminating natural variations, much less for destroying unusual talents. To the contrary, natural variations are recognized as an opportunity, particularly since they are often complementary and form a basis for social ties. Institutions are allowed to exploit the full range of abilities provided the resulting inequalities are no greater than necessary to produce corresponding advantages for the less fortunate. The same constraint holds for the inequalities between social classes. Thus at first sight the distribution of natural assets and unequal life-expectations threatens the relations between free and equal moral persons. But provided the maximin criterion is satisfied, these relations may be preserved: inequalities are to everyone's advantage and those able to gain from their good fortune do so in ways agreeable to those less favored. Meeting this burden of proof reflects the value of equality.
Now the maximin criterion would conform to the precept "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" if society were to impose a head tax on natural assets. In this way income inequalities could be greatly reduced if not eliminated. Of course, there are enormous practical difficulties in such a scheme; ability may be impossible to measure and individuals would have every incentive to conceal their talents. But another difficulty is the interference with liberty; greater natural talents are not a collective asset in the sense that society should compel those who have them to put them to work for the less favored. This would be a drastic infringement upon freedom. But society can say that the better endowed may improve their situations only on terms that help others. In this way inequalities are permitted in ways consistent with everyone's self-respect.
(John Rawls, "Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion," The American Economic Review 64 [May 1974]: 141-6, at 144-5)
Note from KBJ: Rawls says that society may not compel the talented to put their talents to work for the less favored, but adds that "society can say that the better endowed may improve their situations only on terms that help others." What he fails to note is that the better endowed may decline those terms; and where would that leave "the less favored"?
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 