The crucial points are these. When torture has been practiced, it has been unjustified far more often than it has been morally justified. In part this is because it is more often used by the unjust against the just than by the just against the unjust. The forms that it takes in the hands of those whose aims are unjust tend, moreover, to be the most horrible forms imaginable. It therefore seems that anything that makes it easier for governments to use torture is almost certain to have terrible effects quite generally, and in particular to result in far more violations of human rights than would otherwise occur. Any legal permission to use torture, however restricted, would make it easier for governments to use torture, and would therefore have terrible effects overall, including more extensive violations of fundamental human rights. The legal prohibition of torture must therefore be absolute.
(Jeff McMahan, "Torture in Principle and in Practice," Public Affairs Quarterly 22 [April 2008]: 91-108, at 105)
Note from KBJ: This is a slippery-slope argument. That in itself is not a problem, but it creates a countervailing (and to my mind even more compelling) slippery-slope argument, to wit: If torture is absolutely prohibited by law, as McMahan proposes, then terrorists will know that if they are captured, they will not be tortured. This will embolden them, with terrible results. Therefore, there should be no absolute prohibition of torture. I wonder why McMahan cites only the bad consequences for suspected terrorists. I care about bad consequences for innocent people.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 