Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

12-10-90 Monday. The topic in this evening’s Biomedical Ethics class was lying, which came up in connection with the physician’s obligation of veracity. The concept of a lie seems clear until you start to think about it. One problem is whether the liar’s statement must be false. Suppose I tell someone that it’s raining, intending to deceive him or her. Suppose I’ve been outside all day in the sunshine and just came inside; I have every reason to believe that it’s not raining, and in fact it isn’t. Have I lied? It seems clear that I have. But what if, contrary to my belief that it’s not raining, it is? What if a rainstorm blew in without my knowing it? Have I lied? My inclination is to say “Yes”. But many of my students find this odd; they think that in order to lie, one must believe that one is uttering a falsehood and the statement one utters must be false. I agree with the first claim; if I believe I’m saying something true but in fact am wrong about it, I’ve uttered a falsehood but I haven’t lied. I disagree with the second claim, however. Perhaps this is a hard case; perhaps it shows that the concept of a lie is fuzzy. If my students’ linguistic intuitions are any guide, it’s fuzzy, for there was a significant split among them. I probably spent too much time this evening analyzing the concept, but I enjoyed it and I think the students have a better feel for what’s involved in conceptual analysis.