The utilitarian will reject the notion that retribution is a reason for punishment. It is impossible that if A harms B, utility can be increased by C harming B. On the other hand the fact that members of the public have revengeful and retributive feelings are facts of the world that the utilitarian can take into account. Though not a retributionist himself or herself it is possible that he or she will think it useful to take into account the retributionist feelings of non-utilitarians in the society. (A preference utilitarian will have to take them into account anyway, but the difference from the hedonistic utilitarian will hardly be important in practice.) By in a sense pandering to, and canalising in a legalistic and orderly manner, the revengeful feelings of the mob, worse harm may be avoided. This taking into account as a fact of life the retributionist feelings of others does not make the utilitarian a retributionist. Indeed the utilitarian would like to look forward to a state of society in which there may not be such feelings to be taken into account, but sociobiological and psychological considerations will considerably temper optimism about this.
(J. J. C. Smart, "Utilitarianism and Punishment," Israel Law Review 25 [1991]: 360-75, at 374)
Note from KBJ: To a utilitarian such as Smart, punishment is a necessary evil—necessary for the prevention of even greater evils. To a retributivist, punishment is an intrinsic good.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 