It is very important to be clear that philosophy has a practical relevance; I for one should not be studying it unless I thought it had. Academic disciplines can be divided, as Plato divided goods in book II of the Republic, into those which are good in themselves, those which are useful for some ulterior purpose, and those which are both. Philosophy falls, as Plato thought righteousness fell, into the third and best class of goods. If it fell only into the first—if it were worth pursuing only for the mere pursuit's sake—then it would indeed deserve a place in our syllabus; but it would perhaps not be able to claim a very large share in our limited resources. I shall in this lecture, while allowing that the pursuit of philosophy is a good in itself—it has, at least, an entertainment-value as high as that of some less utilitarian studies—maintain that it is also a useful vocation. I shall be speaking primarily of moral philosophy; if this has a use, then the other parts of philosophy also have a use, because they are indispensable to it; this does not mean that they have not also independent uses of their own.
(R. M. Hare, "The Practical Relevance of Philosophy," chap. 6 in Essays on Philosophical Method, New Studies in Practical Philosophy, ed. W. D. Hudson [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972], 98-116, at 98-9 [essay delivered as a lecture in 1967])
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 