Only if we see that logic is primarily concerned with the description of rules for valid inference, not with the building up of a corpus of logical truths, can we gain a just view of the relation between logic and other sciences. Logic is queen of the sciences, but a constitutional queen: she can put in a veto, but not initiate legislation. If logic claimed to supply a corpus of truths in her own right, then other sciences might claim to reach results damaging to this corpus. As it is, however, a logician may well be professionally competent to criticise what is done in other sciences in a way that admits of no comeback from practitioners of these.
A logician, let us suppose, says to a physicist, 'Your theory involves a contradiction' or 'Your argument is invalid'. There may yet be perfectly fair rebuttals of the charges. The alleged inconsistency may be a matter of the logician's misunderstanding technical terms.
(Peter Geach, "Why Logic Matters," in Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements, 4th Series, ed. H. D. Lewis, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, ed. H. D. Lewis [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976], 86-99, at 93-4)
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 