Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

Fears about the practical effects of a soft subjectivist meta-ethics are misplaced. The moral horrors that have been and are being committed cannot be laid at the door of the soft subjectivist, but rather are fanatical extensions of dogmatic and cruel ethical objectivisms, for which a greater measure of ethical skepticism may be a helpful corrective.

(Timothy Stroup, "Soft Subjectivism," Acta Philosophica Fennica 34 [1982]: 99-121, at 115)

Note from KBJ: In my view, a metaethical theory is not to be evaluated on the basis of its "practical effects," but if one is going to evaluate ethical subjectivism on that basis, then one must, to be consistent, evaluate ethical objectivism on that basis—and, as Stroup points out, it fares poorly by comparison. The same is true of religion. If you're going to criticize religion because it has adverse consequences, then, to be consistent, you must criticize irreligion because it has adverse consequences. Most of the horrors of the 20th Century were the result of atheism, not theism. Think Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot, not one of whom was religious.