Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

This woman is seriously unwell, as even the dishonest mainstream media are compelled to report. The Clintons are pathological liars, but you can't lie about your health if you're fainting, coughing, stumbling, forgetting, and having blackouts. If I were Joe Biden, I'd be preparing to debate Donald Trump.

To the editor:

I am always baffled by the arguments regarding ID and voting.

I just can't make a logical connection why a qualified voter would be deterred.

You can't get a job, open a bank account, write a check, rent an apartment, get insurance, obtain a credit or debit card, travel out of the country, or a hundred other things that we do daily without ID. So outside of a recluse completely off the grid, everyone has ID and uses it constantly.

Every argument against IDs lauds the sanctity and importance of voting but doesn't seem to have much respect for the integrity.

Do you refuse to produce ID when you write a check or charge purchases?

Do you refuse a bartender when you want a drink? How about when asked by the police? Of course not.

Why is this such a burden? It isn't.

It sure looks like a made-up problem. It benefits someone. Ask yourself who and how.

Michael Gorman, Glendale

See here. I'm not prone to calling people bigots, but I know leftists are, so I'm holding them to their own standard.

When I teach moral theory, I stress that the theories are supposed to be extensionally equivalent (that is, yield the same decisions as the others at least in cases considered clear)—even though they approach decisions in radically different ways. Any theory not extensionally equivalent to the others will, in that respect at least, be open to counter-example, and every counter-example makes a theory less appealing. The great moral theorists are great in part at least because they found ways for their moral theory to absorb (or otherwise disarm) many of the supposed counter-examples (and related objections). Moral theory is a sort of arms race between theorists who develop new counter-examples (or related objections) and theorists who find ways to absorb them into the theory. The theories as such, the few simple principles that constitute their opening statement, are not what make moral theory interesting to those of us who like doing moral theory. Those principles generally come from common sense, philosophers contributing little more than clarity and precision. What makes moral theory interesting is the arms race. Can we find a counter-example that will shake up those who defend this or that theory? Can we absorb this or that supposed counter-example that now seems to threaten our theory?

(Michael Davis, "The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris)," Teaching Ethics 10 [fall 2009]: 69-77, at 75-6 [italics in original])

Note from KBJ: I don't teach moral theory like this. Theories are not supposed to be extensionally equivalent; they're supposed to diverge. That's what makes them different theories! A normative ethical theory (such as theological voluntarism, utilitarianism, egoism, Kantianism, Rawlsian contractarianism, or Rossian pluralism) is a sorting device. It sorts acts into two categories: those that are permissible (i.e., right) and those that are impermissible (i.e., not right, or, simply, wrong). Different people will be attracted to different theories. I, for example, find that egoism best systematizes my beliefs and values. If a conflict arises between my theory and a particular judgment that I make (or am inclined to make), I must either revise the theory or abandon the judgment. The data of ethics are subjective, whereas the data of science are objective. The only way to argue in ethics is to show others that their own theory commits them to (1) accepting something they don't already accept or (2) rejecting something they do already accept. In other words, ethical argumentation is ad hominem (to the person) in the Lockean sense.

Empty Glass (1980). Still beautiful, after all these years.

Here.

Here.

In his “immigration speech,” Donald Trump, pandering to the anti-immigrant prejudices of his xenophobic supporters, said that he would direct local police to arrest and would immediately deport—without necessarily even giving them a hearing—anyone the police suspected of being a “criminal alien” (whatever that is).

This idea flies in the face of the very basis of our Constitutional freedoms and criminal justice system. Doesn’t Trump know that the president doesn’t control local police and that they are already arresting those for whom there is reasonable cause to suspect they have committed crimes? Isn’t he aware that you are innocent until proven guilty in this great country; that the police are not judges and juries; that deporting refugees—who would be picked up in his proposed dragnets—back to their home countries violates international law?

That’s how things are done in totalitarian dictatorships, Mr. Trump, not in America.

STEVEN MEYERSON, KENDALL

Note from KBJ: Donald Trump wants nothing more (or less) than to enforce existing immigration laws. The dictator here is Barack Hussein Obama, who enforces only those laws of which he personally approves.

Note 2 from KBJ: If I'm xenophobic merely because I want the law enforced, then, by parity of reasoning, Steven Meyerson is xenophilic. To those of you in Rio Linda, that means he's an alien lover.

Note 3 from KBJ: Donald Trump is not "anti-immigrant." He is anti-illegal-immigrant. Either Steven Meyerson knows this or he doesn't. If he knows it, then he's mendacious. If he doesn't, then he's ignorant. I'll let you supply the conclusion.

Note 4 from KBJ: If Donald Trump is "pandering to the anti-immigrant prejudices of his xenophobic supporters," then Hillary Clinton must be pandering to the pro-immigrant prejudices of her xenophilic supporters. Why is only one side badly motivated? Isn't it more likely that Steven Meyerson is biased against Trump and in favor of Clinton?

Note 5 from KBJ: I wish Steven Meyerson would inform Barack Hussein Obama that "the president doesn't control local police." Maybe Meyerson hasn't been paying attention for the past few years. Pay attention, Steve! Turn off NPR, MSNBC, and CNN and watch Fox News Channel for a while.

This essay by law professors Gary L. Francione and Anna E. Charlton is, to borrow the words of Ronald Dworkin, an "album of confusions." The authors conflate so many things that should be kept separate that I don't know where to begin. I'll just make a list (let "Francione" refer to both authors):

• There's a difference between what the law is and what it ought to be. These law professors have competence only on the first of these questions, though, as citizens, they have every right to address the second question. The point is, their legal expertise is not moral expertise. Their moral beliefs or values have no more weight than anyone else's.
• Utilitarians such as Peter Singer can use the language of rights. Indeed, they can lay claim to being rights theorists. Francione needs to read John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism (1861, 1863) and L. W. Sumner's The Moral Foundation of Rights (1987).
• Francione criticizes Singer, but they share the views that (1) animals have rights and (2) these rights are not absolute. The only difference between them is how much preventable evil (or obtainable good) will justify infringing a right. Francione evidently requires somewhat more than Singer, but that's a matter of degree, not of kind.
• It doesn't follow from the fact that some or many dogs are abused or neglected that all dogs are abused or neglected. Why should those of us who love our animal companions and provide properly for them be deprived of their company, and they of ours, because other people abuse the privilege of owning animal companions?
• Francione makes it sound as though, ideally, dogs and cats would never have been domesticated. This is absurd. Domestication is the ideal; it benefits both the animals domesticated and the people who do the domesticating. Humans are domesticated; what's wrong with that?
• Any theory or principle that implies that there is something wrong with the loving relationships people have with their dogs and cats is false, on the ground that anything that implies a falsehood is false. Next thing you know, Francione will argue that, because some children are abused or neglected, nobody should be allowed to procreate. (For all I know, he already holds this preposterous view.)
• If the property status of animals is what allows them to be mistreated, then that status should be altered. This is what Francione should be working on. Trying to get people to stop acquiring and caring for companion animals is ridiculous, and trying to wish away domestication is, well, delusional.

If there is a general lesson to be learned here, it is that law professors are incompetent to address anything besides the narrowest and most technical of legal questions. On any question other than that, I'll take a philosopher over a law professor any day of the week and twice on Sunday.

Sammy Sanchez went down hard in today's stage of the Vuelta a Espana. Tell me: If you crashed like that, would you be back up and riding within seconds? These are the toughest athletes in the world.