If what this society has thought proper to send forth had been a piece of argument, it would have signified little whose argument it was. It would be neither the more nor the less convincing on account of the party it came from. But this is only a vote and resolution. It stands solely on authority; and in this case it is the mere authority of individuals, few of whom appear. Their signatures ought, in my opinion, to have been annexed to their instrument. The world would then have the means of knowing how many they are; who they are; and of what value their opinions may be, from their personal abilities, from their knowledge, their experience, or their lead and authority in this state.
(Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. L. G. Mitchell [New York: Oxford University Press, 1993], 7 [first published in 1790])
Note from KBJ: Burke is referring to the Revolution Society (of England), which, according to Mitchell (the editor), "was founded in 1788 to celebrate the Glorious Revolution of 1688" (p. 293). The Society had issued a resolution of support for the French Revolution, to which Burke was opposed. What interests me, qua philosopher, is Burke's distinction between argumentation and resolution. Anonymity is acceptable, he seems to be saying, if the anonymous person is arguing, for an argument is good or bad independently of who authored it. It is not acceptable if the author is merely stating an opinion in the form of a resolution, for then we need to know the identity of the author in order to determine how much weight to accord the opinion. The opinion of a respectable person (a person of good character) is worth more than the opinion of someone who is not respectable.
This may seem to undercut my long-standing opposition to Internet anonymity, for I oppose anonymity even in the case of argumentation. But I have never cited as my reason for opposition to anonymity that the identity of the author bears on the quality of the argument. What I have said is that it is cowardly to argue anonymously. Think about it. Most philosophical essays are argumentative in nature (as opposed, say, to descriptive or explanatory). Why then do publishers require that names be affixed to them? Why was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) not published anonymously? Do you think that Harvard University Press would have acceded to his request (supposing he had made it) that it be published anonymously? The answer is that Rawls needs to be held accountable for the arguments he makes. It is how reputations are forged. It would be cowardly of Rawls or anyone else to enter the public sphere without identifying himself or herself. It would be like giving a talk with a bag over one's head. As I have said many times, part of being an adult is taking responsibility for your actions. Arguing is an action. If nothing else, this improves the quality of arguments. (Perhaps that is why Internet argumentation is so bad; it is a realm of anonymity.)
To summarize: Anonymity is unacceptable both while arguing and while stating an opinion in the form of a resolution. It is unacceptable while arguing not because the identity of the author affects the merits of the argument (it does not), but because people ought to take responsibility for their public utterances. People who make good arguments deserve to be praised; people who make bad arguments deserve to be blamed. How do we assign praise and blame if we don't know who made the argument? Anonymity is unacceptable while stating an opinion (issuing a resolution) for the reason Burke gives, namely, that we need to know the character of the author before we can determine how much weight to assign to the opinion (resolution).
