But before we can discuss the matter we must arrive at some definition of what is meant by the "objectivity" of ethical judgements. Obviously a person may maintain them to be objective in the usual sense in which the word is used in ethical discussions without maintaining that they ascribe ethical or any sort of intrinsic value to physical objects. What is then meant by "objective"? The simplest way to answer this question is by pointing out what views are excluded by the assertion that "ethical judgements" are "objective." It is clear that, as usually understood, this assertion excludes the following views: (a) that they are not really judgements at all but, e.g. exclamations, commands, or wishes; (b) that, though judgements, they are all false or at least that we are never justified in thinking them true; (c) that, though they are judgements and true judgements, they merely refer to the psychological state or the psychological dispositions of the person who makes them, so that "This is wrong" is the same sort of judgement as "I feel pity for the people in concentration camps," or "I hate Hitler." Any of these three alternative views may be called "subjective" as opposed to "objective."
(A. C. Ewing, "Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics," Mind, n.s., 53 [April 1944]: 120-41, at 121)
Note from KBJ: The first of the three "subjectivist" views Ewing identifies is known as, or came to be known as, emotivism. The second came to be known as the error theory. The third is known as subjectivism. The only thing the three have in common is opposition to objectivism. Ewing should have called them three different forms of nonobjectivism rather than subjectivism, to avoid confusion. There is another, and perhaps more useful, way to carve things up. We might classify metaethical theories as descriptive or nondescriptive. Descriptive theories are either objective or subjective (better: objective, subjective, or intersubjective). Nondescriptive theories are either emotive or rationalistic. Ewing's first theory is emotivism in this classification. His second is objectivism, with the twist that all moral judgments are false. His third is subjectivism. What Ewing calls objectivism is also objectivism in the new classification, with the additional claim that at least some moral judgments are true (i.e., not all of them are false, as the error theory claims). Charles L. Stevenson (1908-1979) was the main proponent of emotivism. J. L. Mackie (1917-1981) was the main proponent of the error theory. I don't know of anyone who was, or is, a proponent of subjectivism. It is something of a whipping boy for moral philosophers.
