Finally, let us turn to a problem of a rather different sort. We have noted that there are circumstances under which one may say:
"You ought to do it, even though you are under obligation not to do it."
And we suggested how such a statement may be put into our terminology. Let us now contrast the following statements, which may also be made under familiar circumstances:
"You ought to, but you don't have to." "Of course you may, but you really ought not."
Where our earlier statement suggested that "ought" is more stringent, more authoritative than "being under obligation," the new set of statements suggests that there is a sense of "ought" which is not entirely authoritative. There would seem to be an "ought to do" and an "ought not to do" which one may get out of if one chooses. The authoritative command now becomes: "You have to."
There are acts, sometimes called acts of "supererogation," which include, but are not restricted to, the great deeds of saints and heroes, and which are such that we can say of them: "You ought to perform them, but you don't have to." These include little acts of kindness and small favors which, like the more magnificent deeds, go beyond the call of duty. We might describe them as acts of "non-obligatory well-doing."
"Non-obligatory well-doing" has a kind of complement, suggested by our sentence above: "Of course you may, but you really ought not to." Here we find little acts of meanness and all of the things we try to excuse by saying, truly, "Well, after all, I'm within my rights." These offensive acts are instances of "permissive ill-doing."
(Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Ethics of Requirement," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 [April 1964]: 147-53, at 152 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: Most people have a concept of supererogation, even if they have never seen or heard the word "supererogation." A supererogatory act is an act that is above and beyond the call of duty. It has all of the following features: (1) it is permitted; (2) it is not required; and (3) it has moral value (i.e., it is morally good). Chisholm has noticed a complementary concept, which he calls "offence" or "permissive ill-doing." An offence is an act that has all of the following features: (1) it is permitted; (2) it is not required; and (3) it has moral disvalue (i.e., it is morally bad). There are also morally indifferent acts. A morally indifferent act has all of the following features: (1) it is permitted; (2) it is not required; and (3) it has neither moral value nor moral disvalue (i.e., it is neither morally good nor morally bad). Can you think of tokens of each of these three types?
