Two major traditions in moral philosophy—different viewpoints in thinking about ethical questions—divide over the issue of whether and to what extent the actual or expected consequences of an action are determinant of its moral quality. One tradition includes those who hold that the moral character of an act is a function of its consequences in whole or in part. We call such a position consequentialist. This view is exemplified by the utilitarian theory of right action, most notably associated with Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and a long line of Mill's intellectual descendants. Utilitarianism holds that actions are right if and only if they produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Other views can be consequentialist, too. For example, the (erroneous) view that those actions are right which maximize, say, beauty in the world, quite apart from the amount of human happiness or benefit associated with that beauty, would be a consequentialist, but nonutilitarian, theory.
The other tradition comprises ethical theories which hold that the determination of the moral status of an action is independent of its consequences. This sort of moral theory is exemplified by the views of Immanuel Kant and those who write in his tradition. In Kant's view, actions are right or wrong on grounds wholly independent of the consequences; an action to be right must have been done from a certain sort of motivation. Moral theories that categorize certain classes of action as right or wrong, such as is done by any list of commandments or prescriptions, also are typically nonconsequentialist. Thus some traditional orthodoxies admonish us to refrain utterly from acts of certain kinds, such as killing, stealing, and lying, on the grounds that they are wrong in virtue simply of the kinds of acts that they are.
Much of the history of moral philosophy deals with the tension between these two basic points of view about the moral importance of consequences, and the attempts on the part of moral theorists to resolve the dispute or strike some plausible balance. Clearly we do have strong temptation to hold the consequences of actions to be relevant to their moral status, and thus consequentialist moral theories have substantial and sustained appeal. However, they have not become fully dominant precisely because we also believe that there is something morally lacking in an approach that focuses solely on consequences, and refuses to acknowledge that certain kinds of action are wrong, simpliciter.
(Samuel Gorovitz, "Bigotry, Loyalty, and Malnutrition," chap. 8 in Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices, ed. Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue [New York: The Free Press, 1977], 129-42, at 129-30)
Note from KBJ: There are three types of normative ethical theory. One type holds that, as far as the rightness of acts is concerned, consequences are everything. A second type holds that consequences are nothing. A third type holds that consequences are not everything and not nothing; they are something. Logically, these types exhaust the possibilities. Gorovitz treats the third type as a species of consequentialism, since it affirms that consequences matter. I treat it as a species of deontology, since it denies that consequences are all that matter. Gorovitz defines "consequentialism" broadly, contrasts it with nonconsequentialism (i.e., deontology), and distinguishes between two types of consequentialism (without giving them names). I define "consequentialism" narrowly, contrast it with nonconsequentialism (i.e., deontology), and distinguish between two types of nonconsequentialism (absolutist and moderate). There is no substantive difference between Gorovitz and me. We merely carve the class of normative ethical theories differently. What Gorovitz might call "weak" consequentialism is my moderate deontology.
Note 2 from KBJ: Gorovitz misstates Kant's view. Kant distinguished between acts that are in accordance with duty and acts that are motivated by (i.e., done from) duty. Only the latter, he said, have moral worth. All morally worthy acts are right acts, but not all right acts are morally worthy acts. If I give correct change to my customers because I believe it will be good for business, I act in accordance with duty (as defined by the Categorical Imperative) and therefore do the right thing, but my act, being motivated by something other than duty, lacks moral worth. Gorovitz says that, according to Kant, "an action to be right must have been done from a certain sort of motivation." No. To Kant, an action to be morally worthy must have been done from a certain sort of motivation.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 