Contemporary moral philosophy has made much of a distinction between Absolutism and Consequentialism, which appears to be the direct descendent [sic] of a more traditional distinction between Deontological and Teleological ethics. Since these distinctions are themselves unclear, it is equally unclear whether they are the same distinction. But neither, I shall argue, marks a useful, or even a genuine, contrast. The choice between Absolutism and Consequentialism, often presented to us, is in fact no choice at all: it is possible to have your cake and eat it, or, as I would prefer, to reject them both.
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A theory of prima facie duties and obligations like that of Ross, which holds, for example, that the keeping of promises is good in itself, good because it is a promise and not because of the consequences, but can sometimes be wrong because of other features of the situation, is equally clearly neither Consequentialist nor Absolutist. And no one, I imagine, would accuse Bernard Williams of being either a Consequentialist or an Absolutist.
The obvious contrast with Consequentialism is not Absolutism but 'Intrinsicalism', the theory that (at least some) actions have a moral value because of their intrinsic nature, and not just because of their consequences, whatever they might be.
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Nevertheless the failure of Anscombe, and her critics, to separate Absolutism from Intrinsicalism has meant that those who wish to defend Utilitarianism, in particular, have felt obliged to attack Absolutist ethics, while those who side with Anscombe, if only in part, have felt obliged to defend it. So we find Thomas Nagel, for example, distinguishing between Utilitarianism, which 'gives primacy to a concern with what will happen', and Absolutism, which 'gives primacy to a concern with what one is doing' (Mortal Questions, p. 54). But the latter, surely, is Intrinsicalism rather than Absolutism, a confusion which makes Nagel's defence of the view that there are other factors which not merely have to be weighed along with the consequences, but may even outweigh them, more convoluted than it need otherwise have been.
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I suspect that the cause of this repeated failure to separate Intrinsicalism from Absolutism is the failure to draw one of many possible distinctions between the right and the good, the wrong and the bad. An action may be bad and yet, in the circumstances, still the right action, inasmuch as it is the lesser of two evils: we have, as we put it, to make the best of a bad job. And similarly, according to some of the more demanding ethics at any rate, an action may be good and yet still not the right action, because an even better one is available. Now if we draw this distinction we can say that if, according to the Intrinsicalist, certain sorts of action are good or bad simply because of the sort of action that they are, then any such action will be good or bad, at least to that extent, regardless of what else may be the case. It does not follow, however, that such actions are always right or wrong, are right or wrong absolutely. That will depend on whatever other factors, besides the intrinsic value of the action as such, have to be taken into account. So we could say, confusingly, that the Intrinsicalist must regard certain types of action as absolutely good or bad, without necessarily regarding them as absolutely right or wrong. I prefer to avoid this source of confusion by restricting Absolutism to the latter position, which seems to be the natural interpretation.
(Don Locke, "Absolutism v Consequentialism: No Contest," Analysis 41 [April 1981]: 101-6, at 101, 102, 103-4 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: Locke's "intrinsicalism" is what I call deontology. His "absolutism" is what I call absolutist deontology. One can be a deontologist without being an absolutist. I call the nonabsolutist deontologists "moderate" deontologists. Locke's "consequentialism" is what I call (surprise!) consequentialism. Immanuel Kant, G. E. M. Anscombe, and Anscombe's husband, Peter Geach, are absolutist deontologists. William David Ross, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams are moderate deontologists. Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, R. M. Hare, J. J. C. Smart, and Peter Singer are consequentialists (specifically, utilitarians). See here for a flowchart.
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 