How would conservatism fare under a program of rationalization? I think its rationale is interestingly different. Here the argument might go like this. Stability of belief is itself a desirable state of affairs and an end to be sought. A hidebound refusal ever to change one's beliefs is nothing but irrational dogmatism. But the desire to maintain the beliefs one already has unless there is some good reason to change them is as rational as the programmatic commitment to maintain one's social institutions unless there is some reason to revise them. In both cases the rationale is the same—change itself is an "expense." It requires effort, energy, will, communication, and so forth. And effort uselessly expended is effort irrationally expended. So unless there is good reason for change, things should be left as they are; and this holds as much for scientific beliefs as for social institutions.
(Lawrence Sklar, "Methodological Conservatism," The Philosophical Review 84 [July 1975]: 374-400, at 389 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: It is often said (or implied) that opposition to homosexual "marriage," without supporting argumentation, is irrational, and therefore (!) rooted in bigotry. This is absurd. The burden of persuasion is on those who would change a long-standing institution. As Sklar puts it, "unless there is good reason for change, things should be left as they are." There is no good reason to change the definition of "marriage."
Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D. 