Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

I leave you this fine evening with a blog post by Princeton professor Robert George, who asserts that "lying is intrinsically immoral." It's clear from the context that he believes more than this, namely, that lying is absolutely immoral. There's a difference between saying that act X is intrinsically wrong and saying that X is absolutely wrong. A moderate deontologist such as W. D. Ross (1877-1971) holds that lying is intrinsically but not absolutely wrong. To say that it is intrinsically wrong is to say that it is wrong in itself, i.e., independently of its consequences. It is to say that there is a presumption against performing it. It is not to say (without more) that it may never be performed, for other considerations, such as harm prevention, may militate in favor of performing it. Suppose, for example, that lying is the only way for me to prevent the deaths of several innocent persons. I may conclude that, despite the (strong) presumption against lying, it would be the right thing to do in the circumstance. I have criticized Professor George's usage previously. His conflation of intrinsic and absolute wrongness narrows the possible normative ethical theories to two: consequentialism (there are no intrinsically wrong acts, and hence no absolutely wrong acts) and absolutist deontology (all intrinsically wrong acts are absolutely wrong acts). In fact, there is an intermediate position: moderate deontology (there are intrinsically wrong acts but no absolutely wrong acts).