There is one more point that remains to be noticed. It is evident that there may be many different ways of distributing the same quantum of happiness among the same number of persons; in order, therefore, that the Utilitarian criterion of right conduct may be as complete as possible, we ought to know which of these ways is to be preferred. This question is often ignored in expositions of Utilitarianism. It has perhaps seemed somewhat idle, as suggesting a purely abstract and theoretical perplexity, that could have no practical exemplification; and no doubt, if all the consequences of actions were capable of being estimated and summed up with mathematical precision, we should probably never find the excess of pleasure over pain exactly equal in the case of two competing alternatives of conduct. But the very indefiniteness of all hedonistic calculations, which was sufficiently shown in Book ii., renders it by no means unlikely that there may be no cognisable difference between the quantities of happiness involved in two sets of consequences respectively; the more rough our estimates necessarily are, the less likely we shall be to come to any clear decision between two apparently balanced alternatives. In all such cases, therefore, it becomes practically important to ask whether any mode of distributing a given quantum of happiness is better than any other. Now the Utilitarian formula seems to supply no answer to this question: at least we have to supplement the principle of seeking the greatest happiness on the whole by some principle of Just or Right distribution of this happiness. The principle which most Utilitarians have either tacitly or expressly adopted is that of pure equality—as given in Bentham's formula, "everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one." And this principle seems the only one which does not need a special justification; for, as we saw, it must be reasonable to treat any one man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason apparent for treating him differently.¹
¹It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution of Happiness, not the means of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of the means of happiness this may involve.
(Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981], bk. IV, chap. I, sec. 2, pp. 416-7 [italics in original] [first published in 1907; 1st ed. published in 1874])
Note from KBJ: Sidgwick has just adulterated his utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism is monistic; it postulates that there is only one intrinsic good: happiness. Sidgwick "supplements" it by postulating a second intrinsic good: equality. But if there are two intrinsic goods, what is to be done when they cannot both be produced? Suppose there are two actions available to me. In one, I can distribute 10 units of happiness equally to 10 people. In the other, I can distribute 11 units of happiness unequally to 10 people. Utility dictates that I perform the second action; equality dictates that I perform the first action. A consistent utilitarian must deny equality any intrinsic value. If two actions produce the same quantity of happiness, but distribute it differently, then a utilitarian must be indifferent between them. The best way to reflect this indifference is to flip a coin.
