A word about method. There is in existence a great body of opinion about moral questions. I conceive it to be the task of the moral philosopher to determine and explain the subject matter of that body of opinion. This is in accordance with Aristotle's teaching that moral philosophers should concern themselves with δόξαι [common belief, popular opinion]. It is not enough to erect an abstract system of thought. It is required that the system should make sense of what may be called the common moral consciousness. There are, no doubt, serious difficulties. Moral opinion comprises many elements of dogmatism, survivals of the past, and prejudices due to the accidents of history. Moreover most men are content to remain in a condition of incomplete clarity. In resorting to a process of cross-examination with a view to isolating and elucidating what is essential and what makes sense in common moral thought, one is often perforce driven to a self-examination consisting in an effort to think very clearly about the matter oneself. But there is all the difference between attempting to re-interpret in clear terms the essential nature of the δόξαι and constructing an arbitrary system de novo.
(R. F. Harrod, "Utilitarianism Revised," Mind, n.s., 45 [April 1936]: 137-56, at 137-8)
