A fifth criticism of utilitarianism is that it is unable to account for certain facts of common moral experience. I do not appeal to generally accepted value judgments; that would beg the question . What I mean is that common moral experience includes distinctions between the good and the better and between the good and the heroic. A utilitarian theory suggests that an act is justified by good consequences, by the net benefit it will yield compared with alternative possible acts. However, in many cases there are many alternatives that would be accepted as right, and all of us admit that it is possible for men to do better than they are obliged to do.
Almost any act causes some benefits and some harms. The utilitarian is committed to justifying the harms simply by the weight of the benefits . The procedure, if it were possible, would perhaps seem reasonable as long as one maintained that only the maximum net good can rightly be sought. But if he wishes to maintain this position, the utilitarian will be forced to deny the facts just mentioned . On the other hand, if he admits that something less than the maximum good may rightly be sought, we are entitled to ask him by what principle he justifies this departure from the standard of good consequences. His only answer must be that the generality of mankind do not do better; therefore, he cannot demand more. The result is that utilitarianism approaches very near to that morality which simply determines right and wrong by taking a vote, and judging the issue by the opinion of the majority.
(Germain G. Grisez, "Methods of Ethical Inquiry," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 41 [1967]: 160-8, at 164)
Note from KBJ: The problem Grisez is discussing is known as the problem of supererogation. Most people believe that it is possible to go above and beyond the call of duty. Utilitarians cannot accept this, for they demand that individuals do the best that they can (in terms of maximizing utility) at all times.
