Utilitarianism . . . is not the only method of ethical inquiry which considers human goods, as ends, as its principles. Another method is possible. This method does not attempt to determine the moral value of acts by assessing their actual consequences. Instead, it examines whether these acts are compatible with an upright will—that is, with a sound love of true good. The moral judgment of conscience depends upon right reason. Reason is right if it is rooted in sound principles. And these principles, in turn, are sound if they ultimately reduce to insights into the goods that man's heart loves if he loves the Good Itself, God, above all things.
Some ends of human activity are not goods that perfect man in himself. Property is an example. Such ends are subordinate and derived; they are not sought for themselves. Some ends are goods that are considered in separation or abstraction from the unity of man. Pleasure is an example. It is a good state of consciousness, but it is considered by itself only when the state of consciousness is dualistically abstracted from the metaphysical unity of sense and intelligence, self and body. But there are certain goods that are intrinsic to man, that are sought for themselves, and that are not defined by abstraction from the unity of man.
Some of these goods have a definite content in themselves; they are not defined by reference to something else. Truth that is known for its own sake, esthetic qualities appreciated for themselves, activities (such as play) engaged in on their own account, and the very process of human life itself—its initiation and its continuance—are examples of such goods. Other goods are defined by reference to something; they are forms of harmony or integration. The integration of the personality, which includes the traditional virtues of temperance and fortitude, is one example. Another is the integration of the agent and his own action, which includes the virtues of practical wisdom and sincerity. The harmony of men with one another, which includes justice and friendship, and the harmony of man with the sources of reality, which is the object of religion, are other examples.
(Germain G. Grisez, "Methods of Ethical Inquiry," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 41 [1967]: 160-8, at 164-5 [ellipsis added])
