The appalling casualties of the entire battle totalled 263 killed, 59 wounded, and 25 missing in action (the four Crows and twenty-one Rees, all of whom survived). Only 359 persons remained on Reno Hill.
The 7th Cavalry had clearly suffered a disastrous defeat. As to how it happened there is no mystery whatever. The regiment of 31 officers and 566 men tackled two thousand warriors resolved to defend their women and children and their tribal existence. Man for man, the brave was a more experienced and skillful fighter than the soldier. The regiment was divided into four columns, only two of which attempted attacks, and then at separate times and places, each, therefore, against crushing odds. It was a classic defeat in detail.
But why had Custer attempted so much with so little? The ultimate reason was simply inadequate enemy intelligence. Custer, like Terry and Gibbon, underestimated both the strength and temper of the Indians. Up to the very last minute, the evidence Custer was so assiduously gathering seemed to conceal the true strength of the hostiles, and to indicate that they were in flight. Yet, Custer was keener on intelligence than his fellow-officers, a fact that will become more obvious as we follow this campaign.
But why did Custer not keep his regiment together? He tried to, but could not afford the delay necessary to achieve it. He detailed more men than he could spare to hurry the pack train along, but it was an amateur outfit. It was Benteen's dawdling, contrary to orders and common sense, that held his battalion out of action. And Custer attacked separately from Reno because he thought the village was in flight, and then terrain features delayed and displaced his attack. What the outcome might have been, if the regiment had been together, no one can say. But since fewer Indians had stopped Crook with more troops, only a week before, no one can defend anything better than a check instead of a checkmate.
Custer's decisions, judged in the light of what he knew at the time, instead of by our hindsight, were neither disobediant [sic], rash, nor stupid. Granted his premises, all the rest follows rationally. It was what neither he, nor any other officer, knew that brought disaster.
(John S. Gray, Centennial Campaign: The Sioux War of 1876, Volume No. 8 in the Source Custeriana Series [Ft. Collins, CO: The Old Army Press, 1976], 182-3 [italics in original])
