Fernando TesonFrom these facts it is possible to detect not one but two related yet distinct humanitarian rationales for the war in Iraq. The first can be described as the narrow humanitarian justification. This I categorize, in accordance with the discussion above, as the intention to depose Hussein and the act of doing so. This intention fits with the view of humanitarian intervention I proposed above: a war to rescue victims of tyranny. There is no question that the Coalition intended to do exactly this. It aimed to do it, it committed itself to doing it, and it did it. The removal of Hussein brought, in addition, prospects of freedom and democracy to the Iraqis. This direct intention was shown by numerous statements and actions by Coalition leaders, and it included the willingness to surrender Hussein for trial on charges of crimes against humanity. On January 30, 2005, eight million Iraqis voted freely in a successful election. Even before these recent developments, there were signs (concealed behind the understandable emphasis of the media on insurgent violence) that good things were happening in Iraq. If things go well, the country will have, for the first time in its history, a liberal constitution that will hopefully guarantee human rights and the rule of law. Most well-motivated observers have welcomed these developments, regardless of their political affiliation (witness the praise from liberal quarters). Surely these events must count in any evaluation of the war under humanitarian intervention principles.

But an examination of the record discloses a second humanitarian rationale, which I will call the grand (and, because of its boldness, more disquieting) humanitarian motive for the intervention in Iraq (again, in addition to other motives, such as disarming the regime). This is the grand plan that apparently underlies American strategy after the September 11, 2001, attacks, and can be summarized in one sentence: Defeating the enemies of the United States requires promoting liberal reforms in the Middle East and, indeed, the entire world. Removing the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq is part of that strategy. The strategy also includes the successful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as promoting liberal reforms in other Arab countries, both friend (such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and foe (such as Libya and Syria).With respect to the war in Iraq, the grand strategy is part of the motivation, not the intent, but it is no less humanitarian. This grand strategy is humanitarian in a broad sense, because it involves fighting tyranny by peaceful and (where required) military means. The intended act was to liberate the Iraqis; the motivation was to enhance the security of the United States by promoting liberal reforms in the Middle East and elsewhere.

(Fernando R. Tesón, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq," Ethics & International Affairs 19 [September 2005]: 1-20, at 11 [italics in original; footnotes omitted])