There are three main ways of making other people support our aims: by compelling them, by persuading them to accept our views, by convincing them of the reasonableness of what we propose. In so far as compulsion involves a resort to brute force we are not here concerned to discuss it. Men may, it is true, be bullied or tortured into behaving as though they accepted a belief which those who have power over them wish to impose upon them. Such outward conformity does not entail belief nor would the use of force fall under the heading of propaganda. In distinguishing between persuading and convincing, as I propose to do, I recognize that I am to some extent departing from the most common usage of these words. There is, however, a clear and important distinction between the process of getting people to agree with us by using non-rational methods and the process of providing them with rational grounds for such agreement. There is not, I believe, any pair of words in common use which clearly mark this distinction. Accordingly, I shall adopt the arbitrary convention that 'convince' is to mean 'to satisfy by rational argument', i.e. by adducing evidence in support of the proposed conclusion. I shall confine the use of the word 'persuasion' to mean 'to bring about the acceptance of a conclusion by methods other than that of offering grounds for rational conviction'. Most people would, I think, say that 'persuasion' covers what I have called 'conviction'. I have admitted that this is a correct usage, but it is inconvenient for my purpose.
(L. Susan Stebbing, Thinking to Some Purpose [Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1939], 80 [italics in original])
Note from KBJ: I use the terms "rational persuasion" and "non-rational persuasion" to mark the distinction that Stebbing marks with "convince" and "persuade." I might add that all rational persuasion, to be effective, must be ad hominem (i.e., to the person) rather than ad rem (to the world). Unless you use premises that I accept, your argument has no effect on me. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that you beg the question against me. To avoid begging the question, one must use premises that are at least as acceptable to one's interlocutor as is the conclusion.
