All ideologies lend themselves to some particular interest, but it is unrealistic to suppose that they are no more than a discreet camouflage behind which the bearers of those interests can self-deceivingly cover their selfishness. It is certainly not a unique feature of conservatism to answer pre-eminently to a particular interest. If conservatism appeals to those who want to hold on to what they have got, socialism appeals to those who want to deprive them of it by force of law, liberal individualism to those who want to acquire it by unrestricted competition.
It is obviously the case that not all support of ideologies is provided by those whose interests would be conspicuously served by the realization of their ideals or policies. Many with inherited and with earned wealth are socialists. Many more who are without significant property are conservatives. It may be argued that that is because of 'false consciousness', because, in the case of the working-class conservatives, they are deluded about their real interests. It is not clear that the impoverishment of the rich will actually enrich the poor. But, in any case, there is nothing irrational or deluded about having other interests than strictly economic ones.
(Anthony Quinton, "Conservatism," chap. 9 in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy [Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993], 244-68, at 261)
Note from KBJ: Ours is the Age of Cynicism. It is widely assumed that people's moral and political views are rooted in self-interest. I reject this. I know many principled people. Judges, for example, routinely issue opinions that conflict with their personal views or values. What I find particularly disturbing is philosophers questioning people's motives. It seems to me that in philosophy, of all disciplines, one should assume the best (and certainly not the worst) of one's interlocutor. This means (1) assuming that the interlocutor's motives are pure, (2) charitably interpreting what the interlocutor says, and (3) making the best of the interlocutor's arguments. Philosophy, in other words, should not be cynical.
