To say that a person is content with the amount of money he has does not entail, then, that there would be no point whatever in his having more. Thus someone with enough money might be quite willing to accept incremental economic benefits. He might in fact be pleased to receive them. Indeed, from the supposition that a person is content with the amount of money he has it cannot even be inferred that he would not prefer to have more. And it is even possible that he would actually be prepared to sacrifice certain things that he values (e.g., a certain amount of leisure) for the sake of more money.
But how can all this be compatible with saying that the person is content with what he has? What does contentment with a given amount of money preclude, if it does not preclude being willing or being pleased or preferring to have more money or even being ready to make sacrifices for more? It precludes his having an active interest in getting more. A contented person regards having more money as inessential to his being satisfied with his life. The fact that he is content is quite consistent with his recognizing that his economic circumstances could be improved and that his life might as a consequence become better than it is. But this possibility is not important to him. He is simply not much interested in being better off, so far as money goes, than he is. His attention and interest are not vividly engaged by the benefits which would be available to him if he had more money. He is just not very responsive to their appeal. They do not arouse in him any particularly eager or restless concern, although he acknowledges that he would enjoy additional benefits if they were provided to him.
(Harry Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," Ethics 98 [October 1987]: 21-43, at 39 [italics in original])
