The POP [People in the Original Position] game is in effect played by imagining ourselves in the original position and then choosing principles of justice. Rawls's POPs come to the decisions that they come to simply because they are replicas of Rawls himself with what altruism he has removed and a veil of ignorance clapped over his head. It is not surprising, therefore, that they reach conclusions which he can accept. If I myself play this game, I import into the original position my prejudices and inclinations, which in some respects are different from Rawls's. I have some inclination to insure against the worst calamities, in so far as this is possible. But I have no inclination to maximin, once the acceptable minimum is assured; after that point I feel inclined to take chances in the hope of maximizing my expectation of welfare, as I do in actual life (for example, I do not entirely refrain from investing my spare cash because I might lose it).
(R. M. Hare, "Rawls's Theory of Justice," chap. 10 in Essays in Ethical Theory [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989], 145-74, at 171 [essay first published in 1973] [italics in original; footnote omitted])
