Recognition of libertarianism as a framework for utopia gives a clear indication of Nozick's pluralism, and that within his political vision there is great scope for people to live according to diverse, and even opposed, conceptions of the good. This observation suggests that Nozick's view is, essentially, a liberal one, being strongly neutral between different ways of life. Yet it seems much more commonly thought that Nozick should be labelled a conservative. The reason for this is not hard to find. A simplistic taxonomy of political views might lead one to argue that views have to be placed somewhere on the political spectrum, and, clearly, as Nozick is closer to the right than to the left, it follows that he is a conservative.
Nozick, however, never claims to be a conservative, and others with similar views refuse the label. Hayek's Constitution of Liberty, for example, contains a postscript entitled 'Why I am not a Conservative'. Furthermore, the theoretical conservative mainstream has hardly welcomed Nozick to its ranks. Roger Scruton, in his defence of conservatism, The Meaning of Conservatism, writes that the conservative emphasis on authority, constitution, institutions, tradition, custom, and allegiance are wholly incompatible with libertarian 'minimal statism'. Moreover, concerning Nozick's view that 'taxation is nothing but forced labour and therefore inherently unjust', Scruton writes, 'if we are to concede such an argument then we abolish the conservative enterprise, and cease to acknowledge the web of obligations by which citizens are bound to each other and the state.' Many traditional conservative beliefs—organicism, natural hierarchy, nationalism, divine intent in the design of society—would simply be an embarrassment to Nozick.
(Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State, Key Contemporary Thinkers [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991], 136 [endnotes omitted])