Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

The Failing and Corrupt @nytimes estimated the crowd last night at “1000 people,” when in fact it was many times that number – and the arena was rockin’. This is the way they demean and disparage. They are very dishonest people who don’t “get” me, and never did!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 30, 2018

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If I Were Brittania I’d Waive the Rules (1976).

Here.

Here.

Sadly, there is no uniformity of opinion in philosophy. A German aphorism defines a professor as someone who thinks otherwise, and this aphorism certainly applies to professors of philosophy. The historian Peter Geyl said that history—the academic field—was “argument without end.” This description fits philosophy better than it fits history. The German general Ludendorff told Clemenceau that the historians of the twenty-first century would say that the Great War was the fault of Britain and France. Clemenceau replied that he didn’t know what the historians of the twenty-first century would say, but he did know what they wouldn’t say: they wouldn’t say that Belgium had invaded Germany. The lesson of this well-known anecdote is that even in history there is a great deal that is beyond dispute. But in philosophy, there is really very little that is beyond dispute. If you want an argument for that thesis, I offer this one: there is very little that isn’t disputed. It is indeed possible in philosophy to advance good reasons for one’s views; unfortunately, in every case I know of in which one can do this, it is equally possible for the opponents of one’s views to advance good reasons for their views—and it never seems to be the case that the good reasons that can be advanced in support of a view decisively outweigh the good reasons that can be advanced in support of the opposing view. Of course, philosophers commonly think that their own views do have this feature: a philosopher who, for example, thinks that there is an objective morality will probably think that the reasons he or she has for thinking that there is an objective morality decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers have for thinking that there is no objective morality. But this philosopher will find it easy to believe this only if he ignores a very important question, to wit, If there are these good reasons for believing that there is an objective morality, and if they decisively outweigh the reasons that other philosophers have for thinking that there is no objective morality, and if they are the very reasons that you are in possession of and which convince you that there is an objective morality—why don’t they convince everyone, or everyone that [sic] can understand these reasons, or failing this, almost everyone? Shouldn’t reasons for believing something that decisively outweigh the reasons that support the opposing position have that power? We can confront our philosopher with this challenge: Why don’t all, or almost all, philosophers agree with you? What is it with these philosophers who take other positions than yours? Are they just stupid? Is it that they don’t understand the reasons you say decisively support the position you take? Are they intellectually dishonest? Are they psychologically weak—do they get some sort of psychological thrill or comfort from believing that there is no objective morality, and therefore hold on to this position even though it isn’t rationally defensible? Are they perhaps simply wicked? If you think any of these things—well, isn’t that convenient for you. If you’re right, then you’re smarter or nicer or more rational than a lot of other people in the same profession as yourself. Aren’t you lucky that it was you who turned out to be the smart or nice or rational one? And, of course, that there is an objective morality isn’t the only philosophical position you hold. You probably hold dozens of philosophical positions, all of which, you think, are decisively supported by the reasons you advance in support of them. And in each of these dozens of cases, there are other philosophers who hold positions inconsistent with yours. What an amazing coincidence: there is one person who holds the right position on dozens of questions, probably the only person who holds that particular combination of positions, and it just happens to be you.

(Peter van Inwagen, "Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?" Philosophic Exchange 34 [2004]: 39-53, at 49-50 [italics in original])

I listened to as much as I could stomach of President Donald Trump’s commencement speech at the Naval Academy in Annapolis late last week He paid tribute to the fact that these graduates have been surrounded by their heroes these last few years. He singled out at least one from the class of 1929. I am absolutely certain that Bruce Voorhees was indeed an American hero.

But wouldn’t it have been nice and incredibly healing for the president to also name John McCain as one of those heroes? He is a Navy man, 1958 Academy graduate, an asset as a leader and senator, and a wonderful example of service to our country.

Mr. Trump could have healed his past disrespect of the Arizona senator as well as his staff’s recent disrespect. He could have gotten those Republicans, who, like me, despise this president and all that he stands for to give him credit for something positive. In addition, he could have “cleaned the decks,” pun intended, for reconciliation with the McCain family, once the seemingly inevitable happens.

But, alas, it does not seem to be in Donald Trump’s DNA to heal or to reach out to say that we may not always agree, but “John, you done good,” even within his own party.

So, as we remember our heroes this week, let us not miss these opportunities to say thank you.

RICH VOLLER

Richland

The Fake Mainstream Media has, from the time I announced I was running for President, run the most highly sophisticated & dishonest Disinformation Campaign in the history of politics. No matter how well WE do, they find fault. But the forgotten men & women WON, I’m President!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 29, 2018

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'Give me, O Lord, an undivided heart', asks the Psalmist. Integrity is perhaps the hardest virtue to achieve—not merely making sure that one is steadfast in sticking to one's principles (or examining them critically when honesty so requires), but striving to make sure that all parts of our outlook fit together, that there are no hidden projections or self-deceptions distorting our attitudes, and that all our beliefs are held sincerely and responsibly. Religious belief, or its lack, is something that touches our integrity as or more deeply than [sic] any other aspect of our outlook. It goes to the heart of who we are, what we take ourselves to be doing with our lives, and how we locate ourselves in relation to others.

(John Cottingham, Why Believe? [London: Continuum, 2009], 16 [footnote omitted])

Stormbringer (1974).

Here.