To the Editor:
I wholeheartedly endorse David Brooks’s defense of institutions and the role they play in giving meaning to our lives. It is no doubt important to recognize the claim that history, community and shared values make on us through them.
I disagree, however, with his implied assessment of a liberal education, which he suggests is anathema to such a claim of conformity. On the contrary, the “presumptions” and “the familiar” that many who value liberal education try to unsettle are precisely those aspects of modern culture that seem to trouble Mr. Brooks—excessive individualism and an emphasis on personal happiness over dignity, duty and societal obligation.
Students who read Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare and the many other figures who constitute the core of a liberal education cannot but be challenged to rethink the values of modern culture.
Kristi Sweet
College Station, Tex., Jan. 27, 2009
The writer is an assistant professor of philosophy at Texas A&M University.
Note from KBJ: Plato has Socrates say that the unexamined life is not worth living. Presumably, the things to be examined include one's beliefs, one's values, one's society's values, and one's society's institutions and practices. Two things can happen when you examine these things. You may discover that they are indefensible. You may also discover that they are defensible. If the former, then they need to be abandoned or revised. If the latter, then no changes need be made. In short, philosophy is neither progressive nor conservative. It neither requires change nor prevents it. It neither encourages change nor discourages it. What it requires (or at least encourages) is reflection. What we do (or should do) as a result of that reflection depends on what it discloses to us.
Here's an analogy. I used to think that unless you move away from the place of your birth, you're acting heteronomously (rather than autonomously). You're letting others (specifically, your parents) dictate where you live. But if you visit other places (as opposed to moving to them) and decide to stay put, you're acting autonomously. Even if your visits are vicarious, you're acting autonomously. The visiting of other places (actually or vicariously) is analogous to the examination of beliefs. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), for example, never left the vicinity of Königsberg, Prussia. It hardly follows from this that his decision to stay there was heteronomous. He could have moved (he had opportunities elsewhere), and considered moving, but chose not to. By the same token, it does not follow from the fact that one adheres to the religion of one's birth that one's religious beliefs are indefensible. What is required is that at some point you examine your religious beliefs. Taking a Philosophy of Religion course is one way (although not the only way) to do this.
When I teach Philosophy of Religion, it is no part of my plan to change my students' beliefs. My plan is to expose my students to the main arguments (classical and contemporary) for and against the existence of God. If a student enters the course as a theist and exits as a theist, so be it. If a student enters the course as a theist and exits as an atheist, so be it. If a student enters the course as an atheist and exits as a theist, so be it. If a student enters the course as an atheist and exits as an atheist, so be it. I'm a philosopher, not an entrepreneur. My job is to educate, not indoctrinate. As a philosopher specifically, my job is to induce reflection (Socratic "examination"). What happens beyond that, if anything, is of no concern to me.
