Three justices dissented in King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. ____ (2015), namely, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. Scalia wrote for himself and the other two. His dissent is the same length (21 published pages) as the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. (See here for my analysis of the majority opinion.) Scalia, who has written widely on legal interpretation, has scathing words for the majority. In his very first paragraph, he says that the majority's interpretation of the pertinent statutory words is "quite absurd" (page 1). Scalia's bombastic rhetoric isn't for everyone. Those who agree with him tend to like it, while those who disagree with him are likely to find it off-putting or even infuriating. I will focus on Scalia's reasoning rather than on his rhetoric, though I will comment on his rhetoric at the end of this post.
Scalia's dissenting opinion has five parts plus a conclusion. In Part I, which is short, he describes the statute (which I call "ObamaCare") and states the issue. The issue, he says, is "whether someone who buys insurance on an Exchange established by the Secretary [i.e., the federal government] gets tax credits" (page 2). Scalia thinks the answer is obvious: no. It's so obvious, in fact, that he wonders why the case is before the Supreme Court. Instead of giving his fellow justices the benefit of the doubt, he questions their motives. "Under all the usual rules of interpretation, . . . the Government should lose this case. But normal rules of interpretation seem always to yield to the overriding principle of the present Court: The Affordable Care Act must be saved" (pages 2-3).
Let's review this. Scalia is so confident that his construction of the statute is correct that he can't even imagine how someone—especially someone as intelligent as he is—could construe it differently. But six of his fellow justices do construe it differently. The only explanation for this is that they're being dishonest. They don't really think there's a good case to be made for their construction; instead, they're determined to "save" ObamaCare at all costs. This is breathtaking in its disrespectfulness. Instead of taking his colleagues's argument at face value and dealing with it honestly and forthrightly, Scalia questions their motives and, indirectly, their integrity. As a philosopher, I find this way of dealing with disagreement appalling, even sickening. Intellectual honesty requires imputing good motives, not bad motives, to one's interlocutors. It requires making the best of one's opponents' arguments, not the worst. Scalia sometimes finds it difficult to separate the person from the person's argument. If you disagree with him, you're either stupid or wicked.
In Part II of his dissenting opinion, Scalia says that he agrees with the majority that interpretation of a statutory provision requires attention to the "whole law" (page 3) rather than to the provision in isolation, but he thinks attention to the whole law in this case supports his conclusion rather than the majority's conclusion. I will spare you the details of Scalia's argument, but the gist of it is this:
- The majority's interpretation of the statutory language treats it as a nullity, which violates a canon of statutory construction.
- The majority's interpretation of the statutory language "makes nonsense of other parts of the Act" (page 6).
- The majority's interpretation "overlooks the rudimentary principle that a specific provision governs a general one" (page 8).
- The majority's interpretation conflates oddity or anomalousness with ambiguity (see page 9). That statutory language is odd (anomalous) does not mean that it is ambiguous. Unfortunately for the majority, it needs ambiguity, not merely oddity, for its argument to go through.
The thrust of Part II is to undermine the majority's claim that the statute is ambiguous. As Scalia puts it, "Reading the Act as a whole leaves no doubt about the matter: 'Exchange established by the State' means what it looks like it means" (page 12).
In Part III, Scalia criticizes the majority's reliance on, or resort to, Congressional purpose. "Statutory design and purpose matter only to the extent they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision" (page 13). Since, according to Scalia, the provision in question is not ambiguous, Congress's purpose in enacting the statute is irrelevant. But of course the majority disagrees with Scalia that the provision is unambiguous, so Scalia must engage the majority's argument to the effect that it was Congress's purpose (plan, design, intention) to make tax subsidies available in all exchanges and not merely in state exchanges.
Scalia's argument is that "The purposes of a law must be 'collected chiefly from its words,' not 'from extrinsic circumstances'" (page 13). Without going into detail, let me say that Scalia thinks the words of the statute alone do not suffice to show that Congress's purpose was to make tax subsidies available to all. He adds (on page 15) that "No law pursues just one purpose at all costs." The appeal to purposes therefore fails. "All in all," Scalia writes, "the Court's arguments about the law's purpose and design are no more convincing than its arguments about context" (pages 16-7).
In Part IV, which is short, Scalia addresses the majority's claim that ObamaCare exhibits "inartful drafting." So what, he says. "This Court . . . has no free-floating power 'to rescue Congress from its drafting errors'" (page 17). This isn't a case, after all, in which there is a misprint in a published statute. For all we know, "tax credits were restricted to state Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to encourage States to establish their own Exchanges" (page 17).
In Part V, Scalia discusses the respective roles of Congress and the judiciary. Congress, he says, has legislative power; the judiciary, by contrast, has "power to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it" (page 18). The remedy for bad legislation is not judicial correction or improvement but better legislation. "It is up to Congress to design its laws with care, and it is up to the people to hold them to account if they fail to carry out that responsibility" (page 19).
In his concluding section, Scalia returns to his (in my opinion scurrilous) accusation that the majority is result-oriented. Its objective, he thinks, was to "save" ObamaCare, even if that meant arguing dishonestly. One wonders whether Scalia realizes that the same accusation can be made of him. The majority might have said (but didn't) that Scalia's objective was to "undermine" ObamaCare, even if that meant arguing dishonestly.
If you're wondering what I think of all this, I'll tell you. (You don't have to twist my arm.) Statutory interpretation is not the sort of activity that generates a single "right" or correct answer. Reasonable judges, making use of the various canons of statutory construction that they have at their disposal, can arrive at different answers to the same question. This doesn't mean they are allowing their personal moral or political views to dictate their conclusions (although an unscrupulous judge could do that). In fact, I'm sure that doesn't describe either Roberts or Scalia. Both justices are acting in good faith (or so we should assume); both are intelligent and informed; both are diligent and conscientious; both are trying to do justice. It's just that the materials with which they're working are not such as to generate a single "right" answer. Had there been a single "right" answer to the question raised by this case, it's unlikely to have made it to the Supreme Court.
If you've studied normative ethical theory, perhaps the following will help you understand what I'm saying. The process of statutory construction (i.e., interpretation) is like W. D. Ross's method, which, taking prima facie duties as inputs, requires judgment to arrive at a verdict about one's actual or all-things-considered duty. It is not like Jeremy Bentham's method (the Felicific Calculus), which is algorithmic. Just as, using Ross's method, two reasonable, intelligent, informed people can disagree about whether a particular broken promise is right, all things considered, two reasonable, intelligent, informed judges can disagree about whether a particular statute is ambiguous, and, if so, how to construe it. In this case, six justices came down on one side and only three on the other. Disagreement of this sort does not imply unreasonableness, stupidity, or ignorance of relevant facts, any more than the fact that two people have contradictory beliefs implies that at least one of the beliefs is unjustified or one of the people unreasonable. Nor does it imply intellectual dishonesty, sinister interest, or result orientation. Scalia would do well to refrain from making such imputations.


